People sometimes wish that they had different preferences than the ones they currently have. Frankenstein’s monster wishes that he didn’t want to be human. Goethe’s young Werther wishes that he didn’t love Charlotte. A smoker might wish that they didn’t like cigarettes.
The preferences that people currently have are first-order preferences (P1s), and their wish to have certain preferences are second-order preferences (P2s). In other words, P1s are preferences for actions and objects, and P2s are preferences for preferences. When people wish to have different preferences than the ones they currently have, they have conflicting P1s and P2s.
P1s and P2s have mostly been discussed in philosophy and economics. In our paper, we aimed to connect P1s and P2s to the psychological literature through addressing the below four questions:
Under what conditions do conflicts between P1s and P2s emerge?
Synthesizing previous literature, we argue that P1s are reflexive preferences, whereas P2s are reflective preferences that take into account values and beliefs. We also expand the traditional definition of P1s as primal and visceral preferences, and suggest that P1s can be more sophisticated preferences that have turned habitual or reflexive: a workaholic has a P1 to always work, and this P1 more likely derived from their valuation of hard work—a more sophisticated preference—rather than their visceral enjoyment of working.
Therefore, we say that P1s are driven by reflexes, which are one’s tendency to act without deliberation, and reflexes can be visceral or sophisticated. We say that P2s are driven by reflections, which take into account values and beliefs. P1s and P2s conflict when reflexes and reflections conflict. In an interpersonal conflict, P1s are selfish and P2s take into account other people’s benefits. For instance, a person may have a P1 for romantic affairs, but reflecting on their partner’s faithfulness, they may form a P2 for having a different P1 that favors faithfulness as well. In an intrapersonal conflict, P1s focus on immediate satisfaction and P2s focus on long-temr goals. For instance, a person may have a P1 for spending all of their paycheck, but upon reflection, they may form a P2 for saving money to acheive their financial goals.
What cognitive mechanisms underlie conflicting P1s and P2s?
The duality between the reflexive P1s and the reflective P2s brings to mind dual-processing theories. We propose that dual-processing may be the psychological mechanism that underlies P1s and P2s: P1s rely on the fast and intuitive Type 1 processing, and P2s rely on the slow and deliberate Type 2 processing.
What should people do when their P1s and P2s conflict?
Linking P1s and P2s to dual-processing theories also has implications for what people should do when P1s and P2s conflict. The current literature diverges on whether people should act on P1s or P2s when the two preferences conflict. If people see Type 2 processing as more normative (or rational) than Type 1 processing, then they will see P2s as normatively superior to P1s, in which case they should act on P2s. While some researchers hold this perspective, we believe that people often experience the struggle between “following their heart” and “following their head”. That is, people may see Type 1 and Type 2 processing as equally normative, much like the proponents of ecological rationality. In this case, P1s and P2s are equally rational preferences, and one criterion for deciding which preference to act on is utility calculation.
Assume that in these decisions utility is derived from satisfying reflexes and from adhering to reflections. When P1s and P2s conflict, acting on P1s satisfies reflexes but contradicts reflections. When satisfying reflexes yields more utility than adhering to reflections, one is better off satisfying their reflexes, and should act on their P1s. In contrast, when adhering to reflections yields more utility than satisfying reflexes, one is better off adhering to their reflections, and should act on their P2s.
How do conflicting P1s and P2s relate to self-control?
Cases in which people act on P1s when they should act on P2s illustrate a lack of self-control. We provide an account of self-control, where self-control is defined as acting on P2s despite conflicting P1s. The P1s-P2s account of self-control combines the merits of traditional accounts of self-control and improves upon their flaws, and is therefore psychologically descriptive, empirically driven, and normatively convincing. We propose preliminary questions about self-control that the P1s-P2s account can answer. Future work can also explore how P1s and P2s relate to regret that stems from the lack of self-control, or how to make use of the P1s-P2s account to create nudges or self-nudges that facilitate self-control.
Conclusion
This was our attempt to addressing the curious phenomenon of wishing for preferences that one doesn’t have, by bridging the philosophical definitions of P1s and P2s, the psychological mechanisms that give rise to conflicting P1s and P2s, and the behavioral implications of this conflict.