Second-order preferences: undesirable desires and unachieved aspirations
(with Craig McKenzie, Shlomi Sher, Piotr Winkielman and Michael McCullough)
Sometimes, we have conflicts between what we prefer (first-order preferences) and what we prefer to prefer (second-order preferences). What are the different types of second-order preferences that different philosophers talk about? How are second-order preference conflicts different from self-control conflicts? Do people intuitively distinguish between second-order preference conflicts and self-control self-control conflicts? When we have second-order preferences for having different core preferences that shape who we are, how should we act? I’m currently working on answering these questions.
Who accepts Description Invariance?
(with Craig McKenzie and Shlomi Sher)
Should we prefer 80%-lean beef to 20%-fat beef even if they’re the same thing? Framing effects are considered irrational because they violate the normative principle of Description Invariance. However, alternative normative accounts have been proposed that Description Invariance may not apply to framing effects. Is Description Invariance a normative criteria for assessing the rationality of framing effects? Leveraging the understanding/acceptance principle–which says that if a normative principle is true, then deeper understanding of it would lead to its acceptance–we test whether participants accept Description Invariance more after reading arguments for and against it (deeper understanding of it) with regards to different types of framing effects. Overall, contrary to traditional claims that Description Invariance is “normatively unassailable”, we did not find evidence that deeper understanding of Description Invariance leads to its acceptance.
When default options explain away preferences: a causal reasoning account of preference inferences
(with Adena Schachner and Craig McKenzie)
We sometimes infer that people who actively switch away from a default option have stronger preferences than those who passively accept it. We propose a causal reasoning account to explain this asymmetric preference inference: while choice is often explained by preference, default options can sometimes provide alternative explanations for choice other than preference, weakening the interpretation that choices reflect preferences. Our account prediccts assymetric inferences in adults, but not in 7-8yr-old children. We are currently running new studies to expand the account and explore why children behave differently. Read more! Poster for a quick glance
Self-nudges in the classroom
(with Celest Pilegard and Craig McKenzie)
Can students leverage simple behavioral tools to nudge themselves to acheive academic goals? I am currently testing whether psychology students at UCSD can set default options for themselves (e.g., automatically sign up for an exam review session) to nudge themselve to attend review sessions. Preliminary data shows that students who nudged themselves are more likely to attend review sessions than those who did not receive a nudge.
Feeling in control and its relation to well-being across 42 countries
(wiht René Mõttus)
I made use of a cross-cultural large personality dataset to compare the link between perceived control and well-being across cultures (with René Mõttus). I found that agentic control (taking action to change the environment) predicts well-being better in individualist cultures than in collectivist cultures at the country level, but adaptive control (adapting to the environment) predicts well-being better in individualist cultures than in collectivist cultures at the individual level. Pre-print!
What motivates strikers to go on strike – Cultural comparison between France and the US
During my study abroad in France, I interviewed French strikers about their sense of conformity and group identity. I then conducted quantitative and qualitative analyses on how culture, conformity, and group identity motivate French and American strikers differently. Read more!